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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past fifteen years, professional team sport.e has 
become an increasingly important part of our social and economic 
life. While in 1959 there were just forty-two major league teams 
in five monopolistic leagues ( A L,NL; NBA; NHL; NFL ) .  by 1974 
this had grown to 1 1 7  teams in eight major leagues (AL,NL; NBA, 
ABA; NHL, '\'HA; NFL, WFL). Accompanying this growth in 
profess ional team sports has been a wave of stadium construction, 
with new stadiums appearing in essentialiy every medium to large 
size city in the U.S . In contrast to s tadiums in use in professional 
sports fifte en years ago these ne\V stadiu1ns have two distinguishing 
features -- with rare exceptions, they are publicly owned and they 
are multiple-use facilities, des igned to accommodate several sports. 
There are any number of issues raised for the economist 
by the growth of professional sports and by the role played by iocal 
gove rnments and the federal government in encouraging that growth. 
The recent Brookings volUllle, Governn1ent and the Sports Industry, 
addresses many of the issues. The present paper restricts itself 
to questions concerning the relationships between attendance and 
stadium capacities in sports. The paper has two main objectives: 
first to present a summary picture of the p.:iterns of attendance and 
* Tables referred to in the text are presented in the appendix 
to this paper .. 
2capacities across and within sports leagues; and, second, to indicate 
some possible explanations for the p2.tterns that emerge. It should 
be en1.phasized that this is at best only a preliminary study and the 
conclusions reached are still rather tentabve. 
The first few sections of the paper deal with a limited 
amount of empi::ical evidence concerning patterns of attendance and 
capacities in sports leagues. Most of the information comes either 
the league publications, sports guides, or from Sporting News,, 
The later sections of the paper are concerned with the decision 
problems faced by team oVi/Il.ers and government officials relative to 
1'short run'' and 11long run'' choices of attendance and capacity. 
ATTENDANCE AND CAPACITY -- 1973-4 SEASON 
Any knowledgeable sports buff is aware of the fact that NFL 
games are sellouts and that tickets to NH.L games are next to 
impossible to obtain. On the other hand, baseball tickets· are al¥1ays 
available (except for playoffs and the World Series}, and in most 
cities this is true for basketball as well. This raises the general 
question as to why such differences should exist a1nong these various 
sports, son�ething which will be pursued in some detail later. 
But first it is worthwhile examini:O.g the actual attendance 
and capacity data for the major sports leagues to see how pronounced 
the differences in fact are. That differences exist is indicated by 
the following summary of attendance, capacity and attendance/ 
capacity ratios for the 1973-4 'season: 
These data in turn represent overall averages of data for 
individual teams, as sho;;vn in Table 1 below. Certain comments are 
in order conce·rning the differences among sports, beyond '!:hose 
indicated with respect to attendance and capacity. In hockey, both 
the NHL and VllHA play seventy-eight game seasons, \Vhile the NFL 
plays a fourteen game season (exclusive of exhibitions). The AL and 
NL play 162 gaines per yi�ar, the NBA eighty-two games and the ABA 
eighty-four games. It might well be the longer playing schedule of 
baseball that accounts in part for the lower A/C ratio for baseball 
relative to the other sports. On the other hand, this certainly is not 
an explanation for the marked difference between the A/C ratios in the 
NHL and the NBA . Ba�eball plays its regular season over a six-month 
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period, football {NFL) over 3-1/2 months (plus 1-1/2 months of 
exhibitions a.nd one month of playoffs plus Super Bo\vl), hockey 
stretches from October through March (plus one inonth of .Stanley 
Cup action}. and basketball has a cornparable length of playin g time. 
Thus each of the sports has roughly a six month exposure to the public 
per year. Finally, weather plays a role in determining attendance 
at football and baseball games but is less important so far as 
hockey and basketball is concerned. 
Turning to the individual teams m�king up the s.even major 
leagues during 1973-4, in the NHL we see that eleven of the se.;-enteen 
tean1s played to over ninety percent of capacity for the season, with 
only Los Angeles and California falling below seventy percent of capacity. 
Following the 1973-4 season, the California club was purchased by the 
NHL from Charlie Finley. It is of interest that ten of the seventeen teams 
play in stadiums either owned by corporations that in turn own the teams 
or stadiums that are privately owned -- New York Rangers, Chicago, 
Montreal, Toronto, Boston, Detroit, Los Angeles, St. Louis, Minn-
sota and Philadelphia. 
The remaining seven tearns play in publicly owned facilities. 
Three privat�ly owned arenas have been built in the recent past -- the 
neVi' Madison Square Garden, the L.A. Forum and the Spectrum in 
Philadelphia. The New York Rangers (NHL) and New York Knicks 
(NBA) are owned by the Madison Square Garden Corporation, while the 
L.A. Kings (NHL) and L.A. Lakers (NBA) are owned by Jack Kent 
Cooke, who also o"wns the L.A. Forum. 
In the WHA, only three teams play to over seventy percent 
of capacity -- Quebec, Houston and Edmonton. The Edmonton arena 
is clearly too small for major league hockey and a nev.' facility is 
under construction there. Houston's success is certainly due to 
(1) a WHA cha1npionship and (2) the presence of Gordy Howe and
his sons. Following the 1973-4 season, New England is moving 
from Boston to I{artford, the L.A. franchise is now in Detroit, and 
Jersey has departed to San Diego. These three had the 10'\Vest 
A / C  ratios in the league. 
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Attendance data for the NFL are not completely cornparable 
with data for the ot112r sports, representing actual attendance rather 
than tickets sold. During the 1973-4 season the. blackout of home 
TV for sellout games was removed by the Congress, and actual 
attendance figures fell because of this, particularly in Miami, \Vhich 
had a season sellout. Only one team shows any pronomiced ·weakness 
at the gate, namely Houston, which had the worst record in the NFL 
and was not affected by the rernoval of the blackout. Of the twenty­
six teams in the NFL, on,ly New England, Dallas and Green Bay 
(four of seven games) pla.y in stadiums O'..vned by the team. 
Interestingly, both New England and Dallas have built their stadiums 
within the past five years. 
Data on basebart point out the superior drawing power of 
the NL versus the AL. Of the twelve NL teams, ten play in stadiums 
built since 1960; only Chicago and Montreal are in 11old11 stadiums. 
In contrast, five of the AL teams play in 1'.nev,,11 stadiums - - Oakland, 
Kansas City, Minnesota, California and Texas -- while seven tea1ns 
are in older facilities. Stadiums owned by teams appear in Los 1\ngcles 
(NL), Chicago (NL), Boston (AL), Detroit (AL), St. Louis (�LJ and 
Chicago (AL} while New York (AL) plays in a privately owned stadium. 
Two team owned stadiums have been built over the past twenty-five 
years, Dodger Stadium, and Busch Stadium (St. Louis). In contrast to 
football, there is a wide variance a1nong teams in baseball in attendance, 
capacity and in A/C ratios, with A/C varying from hvelve percent i.n 
Cleveland to sixty-one percent in lviontrcal. 
Finally, there is the 11feast or famine11 sport -- basketball. 
\Vhile profit data for spo:rts teams are not available on an across­
the-board basis, there is general agreement that the New York Knicks 
are the most profitable team in sports, playing to virtual sellouts on a 
season-long basis, and charging the highest ticket pri:::es in the NBA. 
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Two other teams in the NBA are also close to being virtual sellouts 
-- Seattle and Milwaukee -- with the L.A. Lakers not far behind. 
Note that the Boston .Celtics, NBA champions for the 1973-4 
se:oison, drew only seventy percent of capacity. At the other extreme 
from the 11feast'1 teams are I"Iouston, Clevelanci and Philadelphia, 
drawing less than an average ABA team. 
The ABA also has its two tiers of teams, with the New York 
Nets (ABA champions}, Kentucky, Utah and Indiana being the strong teams 
(though at best marginally profitable), while Virginia, Memphis and San 
Diego play to empty arenas. Given the 11feast-famine11 status of the NBA 
and the gap between the strong and weak teams in the ABA, congressional 
action to modify the proposed NBA-ABA merger t erms becomes under­
standable. Only New York (NBA) and Los Angeles (NBA) play in team 
owned arenas. Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, 
Buffalo, Golden State, all in the f-l'BA, play in arenas that are also used 
for hockey. 
DISTRIBUTION OF ATTENDANCE BY GAMES -- 1973-4 SEASON 
Tables l-7 show the distribution of attendance by games in 
all leagues, excluding the NFL. The tables· were constructed in 
order to determine the nun1ber of games during a season when the 
capac5.ty constraint was effective, as well as to determine the 
importance of sellouts or near sellouts on season-long attendance. 
The contrasts among leagues with respect to sellouts are more 
pronounced than the constrasts with respect to A/C ratios, as the 
following summary indicates. (A sellout is defined as attendance 
at or above 95o/o of capacity). 
League Number of Sellouts '% Sellouts I Total Gan1es 
NI-IL 396 63% 
WHA 38 8% 
NBA 143 21% 
ABA 18 4°/o 
NL 29 3% 
AL 26 3% 
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(Data for the N'FL were not tabulated, because data 
available from Sporting News gives attendance and not ticket sales). 
\hlithin the l\THL, nine teams sold out il1irty-eight or thirty­
nine of their thirty-ni1�e home games, with five teams having sellouts 
for eleven or fewer games. In the ViTHA, only Edmonton has a record 
of frequent sellouts. In the National League, even Cincinnati sold 
out only seven games, with the Dodgers and the Expos 'selling out 
five times during the year. Boston and Kansas City, both with 
relatively small parks, led the sellouts in the AL, with seven and 
five respectively. In the NBA, the Knicks sold out thirty-six of 
forty-one games, with Milwaukee and Seattle selling out twenty-six 
and twenty-eight times. It should be noted that both of these latter 
teams have relatively small arenas. Los Angeles (12), Boston (10) 
and Detroit (9) are the only other teams with a sizeable number of 
sellouts. In the ABA, Indiana (5), San Antonio (5) and Kentucky (4) 
account for 1noot of the sellouts. The l\:entucky figure might be 
overstated, since a number of their games were played in Freedom 
Hall with a 20,000 capo.city. 
Briefly, it appears that capacity operates as an effective 
constraint on attendance in most NHL cities, in Edmonton of the 
WHA, is of little importance in baseball or in the ABA, and is of 
relevance for three to .six cities in the NBA. In the absence of 
deterioration of the desirable/undesirable seat ratio as capacity 
increases, NFL aii;endance '\vould certainly rise if capacities were 
increased for that league as '\Ve 11. 
The in1portance of sellouts or near sellouts to league 
attendance may also be. seen from the follo'\ving data. 
"' u
z 
i!l 
z 
1'.l f-< 
o; 
!§ 0
< 
;'.] 
"' 
0 
f-< 
z 
"' u
'"
fl; 
lf. � 0 .a 
� <
� °" 
�� 
8 u "' "' 0:;: u 
• 
� 
.a 
�<< °" 
00 " 
s� "' "' 0 � 
u 
"' �"' 
i;'•n 
u 
� :'L< "' 
00 u . "' s�"'"' 0 
2 
"'
� 
M 
f-< i;-00 '" 
00 u . "' ..1 ""' �u <"' ·�
�-0 
lf. lf. lf. "lf. lf. � 
O'.) t'- l!) Q Q ..0['- "° r<) C") -
lf. � lf. lf. 
O' co l!) I.{') 
co (',] 1.0 l!) 
lf. � � 'lf. 
;:; <­m " m "' "'
if! if! 
0 "' "' 
if! if! 
" "'"' "' 
� if! � if! if! � 
l!) - 0 '° co M "1 "
..1 < 
� � 
< "'
z 
� 
< 
..1 
z 
..1 
<
8 
ATTENDANCE AND STADIUM CAPACITIES, NATIONAL LEAGUE 
1960 - 1974 
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Another dimension of the_ attendance-capacity issue is the 
intertemporal changes that have occurred. Table 8 below summarizes 
the capacity and ownership characteristics of stadiums in organized 
baseball for 1960 and 1974 .. Over this fifteen year period, eight new 
teams were added to the major leagues, and six franchise moves 
occurred. There were fourteen new stadiums built, of which twelve 
are publicly o\¥11ed, Except for the Dodgers' move frorn the ColiseLun 
to Chavez Ravine, every new stadium has a larger capacity than the 
stadium it replaced. On average, the new stadiums seat roughly 
20,000 more spectators than the stadiums being replaced. Vv'b.ere 
the average 1960 stadiums had a capacity in the 30-50, 000 range, 
the new stadiums are in th•e 40-60, 000 range. This shift occurred 
despite the fact that just seven percent of tl�e AL attendance in 1973 
occurred for gates of 40, 000 and over, and only eleven percent of NL 
attendance. There is no pronounced secular increase in per game 
attendance in baseball, hence the larger stadiums do not reflect a 
building for ihe future. Instead the basic explanation for the higher 
capacities must lie in the joint occupancy of the stadiu1ns by football 
and baseball; the higher capacities for baseball are a side "benefie' 
derived from the fact that the NFL teams actually ne'ed larger 
stadiums. 
For example, in the NL, only Chicago, San Diego and Los 
Angeles play in single purpose stadiums (and Vlrigley Field was the 
home of the Bears until just the last few years). ln the AL, 
California, Chicago, Kansas Gity, Texas and Boston all play in single 
purpose stadiums (but the WFL is now using Anaheim Stadium). It 
will be rioted that stadiums that are for baseball alone have smaller 
capacities on average than the multi-purpose stadiums -- both 
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because there is no need for the larger capacity and because smaller 
stadiums, like Fenway Park or Wrigley Field, make baseball 
watching more enjoyable, and hence enhance attendance. 
Table 9 presents time series on attendance and stadium 
capacities for the NL from 196 0-74. Two aspects of these data 
are worth noting: first, A /C ratios have generally remained relatively 
constant over time at roughly the forty percent level, despite a general 
up\vard trend in attendance per game; second, new s.tadiums generally 
encourage an increase in attendance for several years following the 
opening of the stadiu1n. In the table, asterisks mark the fir�t year 
of operation f or a new stadiu1n. Cincinnati attendance jumped from 
13 , 5 00 to 23,40 0  per game; Ho.uston from 9, 2 00 to 26, 900; Los 
Angeles from 24 , 100 to 3 5 ,  3 00; the Mets from 15 , 600 to 26, 1 00; 
the Phillies, from 9,700 to 2 0,100; Pittsburgh .from 11,000 to 17,7 00;
St. Louis from 16, 600 to 2 3 ,  8 00. Only San Diego { 8 ,  000 to 9, 200) 
sho·Ncd no pronounced increase, Typically, this first year bonanza 
attendance tails off as the stadium becomes more familiar but it 
still tends to be higher on average than in the older facility. Hence 
a part at least of the success of the NL relative to the AL must be 
ascribed to the numbers of new stadiums in the NL as compared to 
the AL. 
We next turn to a brief discussion of the characteristics of 
stadiums being used in the various professional sports. 
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Public versus Private Ownership of Sport Facilities 
This section merely sum1narizes some of the results of 
Okner1s paper [3]. The issue is; whether cities do subsidize sport 
activity by building sport facilities, There are, obviously, problems 
of measurement involved in estimating the amount of subsidy to a 
team. For instance, do indirect effects of having a "big time" sport 
activity count as revenues to the city? And if the amount of subsidy 
is positive, is that not in payment for "community welfare" derived 
from having these activir:ies? If we avoid such questions and look at 
a stadium as an independent operation, we find that the majority of 
stadiums (83o/o in 1 970-1 971 ) are operating at a net loss(l). At least 
some of these losses are .due to the general inefficiency that 
accompanies the existence of an almost free good, so that not all 
net losses may be counted as subsidies. 
To illustrate the extent of subsidies we consider the following 
table (Z) of private versus public ownership of sport facilities: 
Distribution of Sports Facilities, by Ownership 
and Sport, 1 970- 71 Season 
Number of facilities 
Ownership Baseball Football Basketball Hockey Tota la 
Public 16 20 32 4 
Private 7 6 7 8 
University 0 1 4 0 
Total 23 27  43 12 
Source: Author1s compilation from public records, 
a. Sum of individual 'rows may exceed total because some 
facilities are used for more than one sport. 
(1) See table 6 Okner [3J.
(2 ) Table 1 of Okner [3]. 
53 
18 
5 
76 
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We note that the public owns 70�/0 of the all sport facilities, VVhy is 
this the case? How should these facilities be rented to the teams? 
We cannot give a complete theoretical account of these 
questions. After all, rationality must be assumed if we arc to carry 
an economic analysis of these decisions and history is full of examples 
where communities have no .t exactly followed a rational path. On the 
other hand it may turn out that the decision making bodies of communi­
ties have been dominated by forces for which it was best that the 
communities build these facilities. These, however, are factual 
questions and there is no room for speculation about them. 
At any rate, one form of subsidy is in terms of capital 
expenditure involved in building the facilities. Another form is in 
terms of particular rental agreements. In order to estimate the 
magnitude of this last type of subsidy we must find the market rental 
for the sport facility. In the short run, this is a very hard question 
in view of the immobility and the instantaneous perishability of the 
service that is produced, and in view of the stronger position of the 
buyers of the service relative to that of the sellers. 
The approach we will adopt is the following. The next two 
sections consider the 1'short run" and 11long run" decision problems 
of a profit c·riented owner, so far as choosing attendance for a 
fixed capacity and so far as choosing a capacity level are concerned. 
The succeeding section then examines the capacity issue in terms of 
decision making by a municipality. 
1 3  
Short Run Decision Making 
First we consider the short run decision from the owner's 
point of view, that of the 11optimal11 attendance for a given stadium 
capacity. The ba.sic notions are most easily seen in the context of 
a "one game season, 11 that is, where the decision is made on the 
basis of prospective attendance for one gar:ne. 
Let p denote the average ticket price. Then the demand 
for tickets y is related to p through a demand function of the usual 
type, that is, 
y f(p) where f' (p) < 0. 
To keep things really simple, assume that the short run marginal 
cost is zero, where short run marginal cost is the added expense of 
serving one more customer within a given capacity. Then the p1·0Et 
maxinJizi.ng team owne:r acts to maxi1nize revenue. That is, the 
owner solves the problem 
max pf(p) 
subject to f(p) � X 
Let p* denote the profit maxin1izing choice of p. Then p''' 
is determined by the conditions 
( ! )  p''f'(p''') + f(p'' ) ;:;, 0
(21 x f(p'') "" 0
(== 0 if f(p'�) < X)
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Thus it might well be the case that the owner finds it optimal 
to have an attendance that is less than a sellout. In parti.cular, 
attendance less than capacity implies from (1) that 
df(p''') /o!E = -I; 
f(p*) P* 
that is, at p�'(f(p�') < X), the demand curve is of unitary elasticity. 
In fact, choosing the ticket price (and thus attendance) at the 
capacity level implies that den�and is elastic (or of unitary elasticity) 
at f(p':') = X. Hence for given capacity, choice of a sellout attendance 
is n1ore likely the more elastic is the demand curve for the sport. 
Before leaving this simple case, a comment is in order 
concerning the effect of the gate sharing arrangements on the 
attendance/capacity ratio. If the gate sharing arrangement is of the 
fixed percentage type (60 percent home, 40 percent vi.sitar as in the 
NFL; 80-20 home-visitor as in the AL), then this has no effect on 
the choice of the optimal ticket price and attendance, since the objective 
function above is simply replaced by a-pf{p) where a- is the home 
team1s share of the gate. Clearly p':' is unaffected by such a sharing 
arrangement, given that !narginal cost is zero. 
On the other hand, the NL employs a. fixed fee per ticket 
arrangement, the visiting team getting 27-1/21 per ticket sold. Under 
such an arrangen1ent, the objective function becomes 
(p - �)f(p) 
where � is the amount given to the visiting team per ticket sold. 
The first order conditions become 
(I' I (j5 - � )£" (p) + f(p) 2: 0
(2') x - f(p) 2: 0 
. . d I - B)f(p) ( 2 ) Assumtng a regular max1mu1n � 2 < 0 dp 
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then 
P � p�' for P > 0. p p�� if f(p) ::: X and P > p'� if f(P) < X. 
Thus the fixed fee gate sharing arrangement generally leads to a 
higher price and lower attendance relative to capacity than a fixed 
percentage gate sharing arrangement. 
A more realistic model is one in which the team plays a 
schedule of games against opponents of varying drawing power. 
Let yi denote the demand for tickets for a home game involving 
team i. and the hon1e tean1, with y i = f
i 
(p). 
Then the decision problem becomes 
n 
max PI: £.(p) 
i::: 1 l 
subject to fi(p) �X l, .. , , n 
n 
Let L p I: f(p) 
i:::: 1 l 
n 
I: £.(p) 
i:::: l 1 
Let Y 
n 
+ I; A .(x - f.(p)) 
i :::1 
l l 
denote the season-long demand for 
tickets. If p':' is a profit maximizing price, then p':' satisfies 
(3) oY(p•:•) + Y(p•: I P op 
16 
n of.(p•:•) 
:�:> iT i=l 0 
(4) A.(x- f.(p*ll 0 Ai;::: 0, X - fi(p'�) 2:: 0 l ,  . . .  , n ' ' 
Again note that fi(p'�) < X for every i is a possible 
solution, so long as the season-long demand fo:- tickets is of unitary 
elasticity at p':' where fi (p*) < X for every i. This follows fl-om 
{3) and (4) since fi(p*) < X for every i implies Ai = 0 for every L 
Choosing p�' so that at least one game during the season is 
sold out implies that the season-long demand is elastic (or of unitary 
elasticity) at p':' such that f1 (p':') = X for some i, Again, the more 
inelastic the season-long demand, the les s  the chance that any game 
during the season will be sold out. 
This raises the question as to why sports teams typically 
adopt a s ingle schedule of ticket prices that apply to all regular 
season game s ,  regardle s s  of the drawing power of the opponent. 
Assuming no costs associated with a variable schedule of prices, it 
is clear that the team is better off to adjust ticket prices according to 
the demand functions fi(p) than to maintain a fixed schedule of prices
that apply to all games. 
The explanation no doubt rests in part on the uncertainty 
that Would be created for potential customers by a variable ti.cket 
price plan; on advertising costs; on the reaction of owners of visiting 
teams and the gate sharing arrangement; and on the inability at the 
beginning of a season, to identify the high drawing teams for the 
season. But in fact there are devices that are employed by teams that 
have the effect of lowering ticket prices for certain game s -- bat day, 
helmet day, free beer games,  and doubleheaders. It would be surprising 
to find these extras appea.ring in games involving the top drawing 
potential visiting teams. 
The discussion thus far has ignored the complications 
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involved with unce rtainties as to the demand functions for tickets. 
We conclude this s ection by looking briefly at such problems.  
Consider first the case of  a 11one game season. 1 1  As sume 
that the demand for tickets is a random variable with a kno,Nn probability 
distribution. y is the den1and for tickets and q(y;p) is the probability 
density function for y given the average ticket price p. 
Aio.suming that the team owner obeys the axioms of measurable 
utility theory and assuming that marginal costs are zero, the decision 
problem be comes the following. 
max rx. u(py)q(y;p)dy + �<;<> u(pX)q(y;p)dy 
p Jo )x 
where u(.) i s  the measurable utility fu_nction of the owner. Let x 
denote the attendance. Then for y :5 X, x =- y (attendance equals 
the demand for tickets), while for y � X, x = X. 
At a maximum of profits we have 
x 
{ r� q(y;p) + u(py)�]dy + ( l  lo [ ilp P 
{ roo 
+ u(pX) 
J
x �� dy = o, 
where Q(X) fo
'
\ay. 
Q(xl) ou(px) op 
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In particular, if the owner is an expected income maximizer, 
the above condition reduces to 
J:(yq + pyfl\dy + x( l - Q(xlJ + px f00 fldyP) )x P 0 
Expected attendance, E(x) is defined by 
E(x) "f0" yqdy + x(l - Q(x)J 
Hence under expected income maximization, the rule 
becomes: choose p so that 
dE (x) /.'!!> " -1 
E(x)j "p 
Thus price (and attendance) is chosen so that the elasticity 
of expected attendance with respect to price is unity. 
For a 11many game11 season, let qi(y1;p) denote the probability 
density associated with a ticket demand yi for games with team i, 
given the ticket price p. Under independence of prObabilities, the 
choice problem becomes 
max 
p 
i:(J:u(py. )q.(y.;p)dy. + /,00 u(px)q.(y.;p)dy.) 0 1 1 1  1 1 1  l i=l x 
with the following condition satisfied 
n (fo"[du(py. I dq.] d ( _1 °" __ .2;__ q. + u(py . ) -1 dy. + ��{l - Q.(X)) f:'J. 0 Op i i Op i dp i 
(00 dq ) + u(pX) 
J
x dpt dyi 0
where Q.(X) 
l 
("q dy . •  Jo i i 
n 
Let x. 
l 
attendance at a game involving tean1 i, and let 
X ::: L x .. Then
i=l 1 
Ex o I: y.q.dy. + x.( l  - Q.(xJJ 
n 
lc" i:=l 0 l 1 l l 1 
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If the owner is an expected income maximize!', then p is 
chosen so that 
dE2'. /.<!r_ 
EX/ p - 1 
Hence the conclusion derived above applies as well to a 
11many game" season, except that p is chosen so that the elasticity 
of the aggregate expected attendance schedul� is set equal to unity. 
One final cornrnent is in o rder concerning ticket pricing 
policy and the resulting attendance/capacity ratio. The discussion 
in this section has concerned the choices by a profit maxin1izing 
team owner who takes into account the effect of his decisions on 
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attendance because of his monopoly position ih the sport so far as 
his city is concerned. If instead the question is asked, '1what is the 
optimal price frorn the point of view of the society, " clearly the 
answer is that that price should be chosen so that every game is a 
sellout assuming that <;lemand is at least equal to capacity at a sufficiently 
low ticket price. The reason for this is the public good nature of sports 
contests, Given that marginal costs of serving additional customers 
is zero, restricting attendance to less than capacity is inefficient, 
since additional services {viewing the game) can be provided to 
consumers without the expenditure of additional resources. Under 
appropriate lump sum taxes and transfers, every individual in the 
society can be made better off (including the team owner) than under 
monopolistic pricing of tickets. 
Long Jiun Decision Making 
We next turn to the long run problem for a team owner of 
choosing an optimal stadium size. Admittedly, few owner$ today 
actually build their own stadiums; instead, stadiums are typically 
publicly financed, But there are a few cases -- Dodger Stadium,, 
Shaefer Stadiu1n (New England Patriots), Texas Stadium (Dallas 
Cowboys). What can be said about the choict of a stadiu1n capacity 
by a profit oriented owner? 
Adopting the notation of the previous section, and looking 
first at the "one game'1 season, let 
yt 
demand for tickets in year t 
pt 
= average ticket price in year t 
x stadium capacity 
c, costs of operating the stadium in year t 
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I capital cost of the stadium 
T life of the Btadium 
interest rate 
The demand function for tickets can be written as 
yt f(pt' x, t) = ft 
. h 
<lf 0 d£ . h b" . h b h w1t .::;-- < . �- 1s somew at more am iguous. It mtg t e t e case 
opt ox 
that �� > 0 for X sufficiently small, reflecting a preference of fans 
for 11breathing space. ii On the other hand, it is well known that as 
stadium size increases, the ratio of desirable to undesirable seats 
decreases, h�nce �� < 0 for X sufficiently large. We will take 
df h . ' ax < 0 as t e "typical' case.
I
Similarly, Ct C(yt' X, t), with 
I(x), !' > O. 
2Jc 
�2':0• 
t 
<le 
OX > 0, while
The owner's 11long run'1 decisiori problem is the follo\ving: 
max 1/1 
T p f(pt,X
, t) - C(y ,x, t) 
L ' t -Ilxl 
t::l ( l  + i)
t 
subject to y t f{pt' x, t) � x 
Let L denote the Lagrangeian, where 
L 
T 
<6 + L X,lx - f(p ,x,t)) 
t=l t 
1, • . .  , T. 
At a maximum we have 
I I) 
oL _ 
opt 
- ! 
ilf 
pt� + f pt t 
<Jc, - oy t 
at, l !i 1 + opt II , 
i) t -
ilt, ),t Tr" t 
0 
(2) 
oL 
ilx 
T ( ii£ oc )) , T ( of ) � PtOxt - dxt (1 + i) - ri(X) + t;At 1 - O; = o 
(3) ),tlx - f(pt 'x' t)) 0 
At� 0, X - f(pt'X,t) :::::_ o 
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As usual, At can be interpreted as the value of an additional 
unit of capacity in year t in terms of discounted net cash flows. In 
fact, solving (1) for At' we 'obtain 
\ I . t {MRt - MCt) (1 + i) 
where Rt ptyt, MRt 
oRt 
Oyt
' Met 
oCt 
OYt
. Let I\ Rt c,. 
Then 
on, 
ay 0. t 
iln,; , \ o - (I+i) ay, 
Note thal yt < X in1pli.es At 0 which in turn impl.i.es 
If MCt 0, then yt <X reduces to the case where price 
(and attendance) is chosen such that demand for that year is of unitary 
elasticity. 
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Is it ever optimal to choose a stadium size with 11buiJt in'1 
pe rmanent excess capacity? This would be the case where At = 0
for every t. From (2) it is imn1ediate that this can only occur if 
a't 
ax > 0 for some t. But for the Pltypical n case, 
af 
a; < 0, hence it 
is only when the advantages of breathing space, availability of tickets, 
etc. , outweigh the lower ratio of desirable to undesirable seats of an 
increas� in capacity that 01. stadium \vould be built that is never 
intended to sellout. 
Substituting for .�t into (2), the rule for choosing stadiu1n 
capacity beco1nes 
-= = L - i - -= + p � - � (1 + i)t dI 
T {an, ( af') af ac }/ 
dx t=l 8yt Bx 
tax ax 
This is the usual condition: add capacity to the point where 
the increase in capital cost I, caused by adding one unit to capacity, 
is equal to the increase in the discounted present value of profits 
associated with the added unit of capacity. For those years in which 
attendance is less than capacity , the added capacity is only a source 
af 
of costs, p _:·giving the loss due to the decrease in demand associated tax ac 
with added capacity and &x
t giving the added costs of operati.ng the 
stadium because o f  the higher capacity. ¥then the stadium is sold out (an, ) an, ( · a£,) 
-- > 0 , each additional seat increases profits by - 1 - -=- , ayt ayt ax 
(1 - :; ) representing the net change in tickets sold due to adding one 
unit to capacity. 
When we turn to the many g'amc season with probabilistic 
demand, the decision problem becomes 
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where 
max 
p 
T ( n !lox . . 
. 
L L u(T:�)qi(y�;pt;X)dy� + t=l i=l 0 fx00u1rr:Jqidy: I)/ l + 
i yt demand for tickets in year t for a game with team
i n, 
i i ptyt -C(yt'X' t)
_i -nt = ptx
i -qi (yt;pt' x)
C(X,X,t) 
probability density of y!, given pt and X,. 
For an expected income maximizing owner, the rules fOr 
choosing capacity reduce to 
I I) 
(2)
where 
n 
I 
(" . ac ) 
. (" . aq. 
. ?: Jo (Y� --i qi
dy�+ Jo PtY�ap1a
y�+X{l -
i=l 0 Byt 0 t 
�00 aqi i I/ t+ pX 8dy (1 + i) 
-
pt t 
0 t "" ! ,  . . .  , T 
Q!{X)) 
T (;n lo"( ac . aq.) . L L: -axt qi + Ti�as/ dy� + (l b:d i:ool 0 ( ac,)_ Q�(X)) Pt -ax 
r 00-i aq, ')1 I , + Jx ntaxdyt y ( l +il 
i o,1xJ ' ' f .
. 
qi(yt;pt" X)dyt
d! 
dx
i)t - I(X) 
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Let x! attendance in year t for games with teo,rn i, and 
n . 
let xt _ L x 1 = season attendance. Theni::: 1 t 
E(Xt) �{lo"y;q,dy' + x(J - 0;1x1J} 
When MCt 
short run condition 
0, then condition (I) reduces to the farniliar 
dE(X,J/dpt 
E(Xt) pt 
-I 1, • . •  , T 
Condition (2} asserts that, given the pricing policy of 
condition (1), X is set so that the added capital cost of the last unit 
of capacity is equal to the expected value of discounted profits attained 
by adding that last unit. In the 11typical"
aq. . aq. 
axl > 0 for low values of y� and ax:< 0 
case, we expect 
for high values of yi, l 
reflecting the undesirable properti.es of large stadiums so far as 
average ticket prices are concerned. 
Finally consider the choice of an optimal stadium capacity 
by a profit oriented owner, when the stadium is to be used lo hcuse 
t"."o sports teams operating in different sports. In the simplest 
case of a 11one game'1 season, the choice problem for the owner 
becomes 
max " � 
T 
L P/IP,• x, t) 
to- l � 
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T 
+ L w g("' , x, t) 
t= l t t 
- C(yt' zt, X, t) - I(X) 
subject to 
y ; t f(p x fj s x t' ' -
zt =:; g(wt'X,t
);;;; X 
where yt' zt c1enote attendance at games in the two sports and pt' wt 
are the average ticket prices for games in the sports. 
Let 
and let 
ft E f(pt'X' 
t). gt g
(wt'X,t), Ct 
L 
T T 
¢ + L: ).,rx - fJ + L: u,lx - gl t:= 1 to- l 
At a maximum we have 
C(yt' zt' X, t), 
(!) 8Jo apt 
a£, ac, a£, a£, ft+ Pt apt - ayt apt 
- "tapt = o 
(2) 
(3) 
BL agt act Bgt Bgt 
awt 
= gt+wtawt - a;; awt -µtawt:::; 
0
aL 
ax 
T Bft 
LPt ax t= 1 
T agt 8C T 
( + L:: w - - _, + L' 1 
t=l tax ax t=l t 
Brr 
8£
) 
T ( 8g 
) 
d 
__ 
t + '"'"'µ 1 _  t _ _!_ =. 0ax 17i t ax ax 
It is immediate that /.\ 
arr t 
av' µ t t 
_t, with A > 0 only if a zt t 
y t = X, µt > 0 only if zt :. X. 
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Hence (3) may be wi·ittcn as 
d! 
dX 
T { arr, ( 8£'
) 
8rrt ( ag' ) - l ·- + - 1 - + � Byt BX Bzt Bzt P,:�: + w 
a
a�t -
a
,,:� l ux t x ux. f 
Note that it might well be the case that the optimal strategy 
is one in which the stadium is never sold out for one sport, because of 
the profitability of the added capacity for the second sport. This 
a TI a� 
would occur, say, if�= 0 for every t but�> 0 for some t, Yt( ac ac ) z, 
assuming marginal cost __ t, � is zero. This expresses the 
· . Byt zt ( af 8g ) 
intuitive notion that in the "typical11 case ax
t 
< 0, axt < 0 a single 
purpose stadium is never built with permanent excess capacity by a 
profit oriented owner, but a multiple purpose stadium might v.rell have 
built-in excess capacity for one (but not all) sports. 
Consider in contrast the situation in which a municipality 
arrives at the decision as to capacity levels for a sports stadium, as 
in the discussion of the next section. 
Tean1. versus Community Choices 
The question asked by Okner [3} is: does a community 
subsidise a sports team when it builds a stadium? The question 
may be safely answered in the affirmative as Okner's paper [3]
den1onstrates. 
We ask two related questions; should a community 
subsidise a sports activity? and should a profit maximizing team 
build its own facility? The, not surprising, answer to "the first 
question is that the community would, on the margin, subsidize 
sports activity if its '1marginal utility" with respect to that 
activity is positive. Subsidy is defined, here, as the excesses of 
maintenance, rental and gross investment costs over sport 
generated revenue. A team would not build its own facility if its 
imputed net returns on an additional capacity unit is less than the 
marginal cost of constructing such a unit. In co1npuling the net 
returns, the .team figures on a subsidy by the community. 
Obviously, the team1s decision is influenced by the size of the 
subsidy. 
In the discussion below, we concentrate on an extreme 
case. The city acts as a consumer and producer which controls 
all activities. 
The team acts as monopolist as far as ticket pricing is 
concerned and considers rentals as given, In a real situation, 
there is a conflict which is settled according to the powers of the 
negotiators. 
We outline a simple model for decisions by the team and 
community and state some implications of their choices. 
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Assume that the community's economic level is denoted by 
J+l y and several sports activities whose levels are denoted by
yj ,
j=l, 2, . .. , J, As a result of these activities, certain net revenues 
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are produced. 
Jtl 
Nel revenues are related to the vector (y, y ), where 
y is a vector whose components are yj
, 
s, by way of J+l functions 
J+l J+l J+l g(y, y ), g (y, y ), each of which corresponding to an activity. 
The operation of these activities is, however, constrained by the 
availability of certain facilities that are required for their operation. 
Examples of such facilities are seating capacity of stadiums, trans­
portation systems and housing. We shall aggregate the non-stadiurn 
f -1- . f ·1· d d . b J+
l 
h act ibes into one aci ity an enote its capacity y x T e 
seating capacities for various sport activities are denoted by 
xj,j=l, .. , ,J. Each xj represents an Sj-vector (a vector with Sj 
components), each of whose components is a seating capacity of a 
th 
certain type for the j- sport activity. The seating capacity require-
ment is given by function;s; hj(yj), Each of these functions is 
S
j
-vector valued. The non-sporl 
- J+l J+l given by a function h (y, y ). 
written as: 
activity capacity requirement is 
The capacity constraints are 
(1 )  h\yi) " ) j=l, ... ' J 
J+l
( 
J+l
) 
< J+l
h y, y - x 
The method of p.roducing sport capacity is to build stadiums 
and we always think in terms of a multiple use stadium . Ghren the 
size of a stadium, denoted by 2, we inay determine the various 
seating capacities as functions: 
(2) ) xj (g), j=l, ... ,J. 
Assuming some flexibility in seating arrangements it is 
possible to transform one capacity to anothe!' This is expressed by 
way of a transformation function: 
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( 3) J x::: x ,  . . ,x f (x) :$ 0 , 
The net addition to stadium size is "given by: 
• 
(4) B = 11 -a1 Z 
where 11 denotes gross addition and where a1 is the rate of depreciation .
The net addition to non-sport capacity is given by: 
(5) .J+l J+l x = 12 - a2 x 
where 12 ar..d a2 are gross addition and depreciation rates. 
Suppose it costs C1(I1) to add 1 1 units of stadium size and it 
costs c2(I2) to add one unit of non-sport capacity. Then the community1s 
budget constraint may be written as: 
(6) f T [ J+l 
0 I: 
j J+l ,l -rt g(y,y ) -C1 (I 1 ) -C2(I 2 � e dt<'.0, 
j=l 
where Tis the length of the planning period and r is the interest rate. 
Side-stepping the interesting question of choice of a comrriunity 
criterion, we assume that the community maximizes a function: 
I T J+l -Pt 0 W (y, y ) e dt, where P is the discount rate. 
Substituting fro1n (2) in (1) and (3) our problem becomes: 
Maxin1ize I T J+l - pt W( y,y ) e  dt 0 
(7) Z=r1 a1E
( 8 )  
.J+l J+l x = 12 -a2 
x 
subject to: 
(9) 
(10) 
(1 1) 
(12)
)p;:> - hil,)H; o • i = i • . . . •  J. 
J+l hJ+l( 
J+l) ) x y, y =· 0 • 
- f( x(Z) ) � o. 
J
, T J+l j J+l -rt 
[I;g (y,y ) -cp1) -C2(I,J e d
t�O. 
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Assume concavity of W 1 of the left hand sides of 9) - 11) 
and of the integrand of 12) . Assume also that all functions are 
continuously differentiable and assun�e normality. Then, see 
Mangasarian [2] and Hestenes [ l], it is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for a maximum that there exist functions Ai ). , µ µ J+l 
• q, ·-· • ' 
and a constant ')' such that: 
(13)
(14) 
(15) 
(16)
(17)
(18) 
(19)
W 
-Pt jhj . e -µ . 
y3 YJ 
J+l . ' 
J+l J+l � J -rt -11 h.+ Y"' g,e =O 
i ]=l y1 
J+l 
-Pt J+l
h
J+l 
W e - µ yJ+l yJ+l 
+YI i -rt 
j=l 
gyJ+l 
e = o 
, -rt A 1 = Y c 1 e 
'2 
= Y c' e -rt 
• 
ii.I = 
• 
). = 
2 
2 
( A1 - q fx x') a1 
- µ J+l >. a 2 2
J 
- I µ j x j 
j=l z 
From 13) it follows that: 
w .  µih j. 
YJ YJ 
+ µ 
J+l J+l 
h 
yj 
·' 
Yl:J -rt . g e l ·' yl 
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. j J +l . The functions µ and µ may be interpreted as rental rates for 
capacities and the constant Y rriay, in view of 15 and 16, be interpreted 
as the rate of imputed return per unit of additional investment. This 
justifies interpreting the right hand side of (19) as n1arginal subsidy for 
sport activity j. To clarify this, assume 1,Vy j 
= 0 • i.e. assume that 
there is no 11pleasuren to be derived from running sport activity j. 
Then (19) becon1es the usual marginal cost= marginal revenue condition 
which, in view of concavity, is necessary and sufficient for the 
community maximization of profits. 
Turning our attention now to the team's point of view, we 
assume that the team1s choice of ·optional stadium capacity is a choice 
of optimal mix between rented capacity and owned capacity. In real 
situations, a choice never exists where one could rent a positive amount 
of capacity and use a positive amount of one's own capacity. The real 
situation is represented either by choice where one uses zero rented 
capacity or zero owned capacity. We assume further that the team1s 
objective is to minimize discounted net cash flow: 
(20) 
T J0 [ pj Yi (pi) _ Ri(yj, ( i) _ Cj (Ii) _ Li (yi)] e -rt, 
where yj (pj) is the demand function for the teams activity as a function 
of ticket price pj, Rj is total rent of public facilities �-· Cj (Ij) is the . l . . 
total cost of gross investment 13 in adding to capacity and L3 '(yJ ) is 
operating cost. 
The net addition to capacity, xj, is given by; 
(21) xj =lj- aj xj Ij > o 
and the capacity constraint is given by: 
(22) 
. 
i 
. 
,,.' (p ) � Xl + .; i 
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Assuming concavity of the integrand of (20) and assurrdng 
normality it is necessary and sufficient for an optimum that there 
exist functions A. and µ. such that: l l 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
• 
>. j 
" >. ai µ· J 
[Pj i + yj - Rj. yj . 
pl yl pl 
ci. -rt A 
Il 
e + j < 0 ' 
Rj . - � l + µj � 0
Lj� J -pt_µ· 
yj Pj e J yj . = 0 pl 
The team will follow a path of zero gross investment :in 
capacity if: 
(27) >. i < c
j. 
rl 
-rt e 
By (26), \vhich holds as an equation in this situation, 
(28) µi Ri (i 
Thus the gross instantanious return on owned capacity equals the 
cost of renting an additional unit of publicly owned capacity. 
By 27), 23) and 28), the team will follow a rent all path if the 
imputed marginal cost of rental is less than the marginal cost of 
construction. 
The relatiorl between the community1 s choice and the team's 
choices may be outlined as follows: 
The city maximizes its utility and thus determines rental terms 
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and subsidies to the teams. With this as data, the teams make a 
profit maximizing behaviour. Under certain conditions on the 
communities welfare function, the two sets of choices will coincide, 
This manner of dealing with the problem, however, avoids 
the conflict of interest situation that exists in real life, 
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Concluding Remarks 
The theoretical sections of this paper have emphasized 
the importance of the marginal costs of construction and of marginal 
revenue (in terms of discounted present value) as determinants of 
0optimal" stadium capacity, whether from the point of view of a 
profit oriented team owner or from the point of view of a munici­
pality. If data were readily available on marginal construction 
cost and on marginal revenue, it would be possible to arrive at 
relatively straightforward answers to the questions concerning 
apparent exces s  capacity in baseball, and apparent lack of capacity 
for football and NI-IL hockey. Unfortunately, s uch data are not 
available ,  at least to the knowledge of the authors, 
Another approach that s uggests itself is to take a team 
like the L. A. Dodgers, which owns its own single-purpose facility, 
as a standard against which other baseball tea1ns can be judged. 
At a minimum, the Dodgers provide a guide as to whether or not 
privately owned single purpose facilities in baseball would duplicate 
the pattern of capacity presently found in the major leagues. The 
Dodgers play to roughly 48o/o capacity {average over the 12 years
Dodger stadium has been in existence), and had 5 sellouts during 
the 1973 season, The only NL team with more sellouts is Cincinnati;
the only teams with higher A/C records over an extended period of 
time are Montreal and the New York :tvfets.  St. Louis, with a 
privately owned dual-purpose stadium, runs at around 45o/o of 
capacity, with 3 sellouts in 1973. A very crude calculation suggests
that the marginal revenue for the Dodgers is quite small; that i s ,  
the added revenue received for one additional seat i n  Dodger Stadium, 
An additional customer brings in roughly $3 in tic:ket price, less
27 1 /2 ¢ visiting share, plus $1 iri parking, plus perhaps 40¢ i n
concession profits, adding u p  t o  around $4. 10. But this is average 
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revenue p e r  customer. The last seat in the Stadium is sold only 5 times 
a year, for a season long revenue of $20.50.  
Marginal revenue can be calculated using the formula 
MR = (l - l/e )AR, 
where c is the elasticity of demand. If e is close to unity, then MR is 
clos e to zero, given that AH.. = $20.50, Noll's study in Government and 
the Sports Business finds e for baseball not significantly different from 
one. At e = 1.1, MR = $2.30 on a beason long basis . Given a discount
rate of lOo/o and assuming that Dodger Stadium has a life of 20 years or 
more, the dis counted present value of revenue of the last seat in the 
Stadium is in the neighborhood of $20 - $25. For s tadiums that are 
sold out less than 5 times per year, marginal revenue is pr'oportionately 
les s .  Further, the figure of $20 - $25 must be decreased to take into 
account the fact that adding seats reduces the ratio of desirable to 
undesirable s eats,  thus lowering demand as a function of the average 
ticket price. In any cas e ,  equating marginal profitability to marginal 
investment cost  means that the marginal cost  of adding a seat to Dodger 
Stadium is in the $20 range.  
This figure might be contrasted with average costs of seats in 
baseball s tadiurr1s.  Data on three stadiums constructed in the mid-19601s  
give an average cost per seat  in the range between $400 -and $500.  This 
reflects the very heavy fi xed costs associated with. s tadium construction, 
including such things as Land acquisition, etc .  
The basic conclu.sion thal is  reached is that baseball stadiums 
are generally larger than would be the case if they were operated as 
single-purpose facilities by a profit maximizing owner. There are fewer 
sellouts and a lower .ratio of attendanr,c to capacity than would be regarded 
as optimal from the owner's point of view. On the other hand, NFL games 
tend to be sellouts. At a $20 marginal cost for adding a s eat,  arc football 
stadiums sn1aller than would be constructed by a profit maximizing owner? 
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The revenue received per ticket by an NFL team is  probably 
in the $7 to $7.50  range,  representing the 60% borne share of a $10
ticket, plus conc e s s ion income. With · ?  s e llouts per year, this adds 
up to a r e venue of around $50 per seat. Given an elasticity of. demand 
of 1.1, MR is approximately $5 on a season long basis, which converts 
to a discounted present value of near $50, at ar. interest rate of 10%. 
If $20 is the appropriate value of marginal cost of construction in 1962,  
when Dodger Stadium was built, $50 is certainly net an unreas onable 
figure for 1974. What this suggests is that in fact NFL seating capacily 
is probably not all that short, if viewed in terms of pure profit 
maximization. An additional indication is provided by the seating 
capacities of Shaefer S tadium and Texas S tadium, both in the 55 - 60,000 
range ,  as  contrasted with the new public s tadiums in Kansas City and 
Buffalo, both at around 80,000 capacity. 
The situation with respect to basketball and hockey arenas is 
much more complex, since such arenas have year-round use for ice 
shows, circuses,  conventions, etc. Bas ketball and hockey even 
combined (as in Madison Square Garden and the L. A. Foru m )  only 
account for some 80 nights of the year, leaving 285 dates to be filled 
by non-sports events. Hence the relevant consideration in choosing 
capacity for an arena, unless it is specializeC to lOOo/o sports use ,  is  
probably not the attendance at s por·ts events , which means lhe analysis 
of this paper is les s  relevant for basketball and hockey than for football 
and baseball. 
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HOCKEY 
�
St. Louis 
New York ' R .  
Chicago 
Montreal 
Philadelphia 
Toronto 
Buffalo 
Vancouver 
Boston 
l'v1i nne so ta 
Atlanta 
Detroit 
New York Is . 
Los Angeles 
Pittsburgh 
California 
NHL 
Attend 
TABLE 1 .  ATTENDANCE AND CAPACITIES 
ALL SPORTS, 1973-4 SEASON 
(Attendance and Capacity in Thousands)  
Per Game Capacity A/C WHA 
1 8. 4 18.  0 1 02% Vancouver 
17. 9 !'I .  5 1 02 Quebec 
1 7. 4 18 .  0 97 Houston 
17.  2 18 .  4 94 Minnesota 
16. 6 16.  6 1 00 Winnipeg 
16. 0 16 .  5 97 Clevela'nd 
16. 0 15 .  2 1 05 New England 
1 5 .  6 1 5 .  6 1 00 Los Angeles 
15 .  0 1 5 .  0 1 00 Chicago 
1 5 .  0 1 5 .  0 1 00 Edmonton 
14. 2 1 5 .  3 9 3  Toronto 
13. 2 15. 8 84 Jersey 
1 2 . 8 14. 7 87 
1 1 .  1 1 6 . 0 69 
1 0. 0 12 . . 6 79 
4. 8 ! ?  . . 5 38 
1 4. 5 1 5 .  8 9Zo/u W HA  
Attend 
Per Game '�apacity A/C 
9. l 1 5 .  6 5 8 % 
7 . 9  1 0. 0 79 
6. 7 9. 3 72 
6. 7 1 6. 2 41  
6 .  5 u . o  59 
6 . 2 9 . 5 65 
5. 4 15.  0 36  
5 .  3 14. 7 36 
4. 7 9 . 0 52 
4. 3 5 .  2 83  
4 .  2 9. 3 45 
2. 7 l ] .  0 25 
5. 8 1 J .  3 5 1% 
BASKET BALL Attend Attend 
NBA Per Game Capacity A/C ABA Per Game Capacity A/C 
New York 19. 3 19. 6 99% New York 8. 9 16. 0 56% 
Los Angeles 14. 8 17. 5 85 Kentucky 8. 2 11. 5 71 
Seattle 12. 2 12. 7 9 6  Indiana 7 . 3 9. l 80 
Boston 10 7 15. 3 70 Utah 7. 0 12 . 2 57 
Milwaukee 10. 2 10. 7 95 San Antonio 6. 3 10. l 62 
Buffalo 10. 0 17. 3 58 Carolina 6. l 13. 2 46 
Capitol 9. 3 17 .  5 5 3  Denver 4. 2 6. 8 62 
Chir::ago s. 3 17. 4 48 Virginia 3. 0 10. 4 29 
Portland 8. 0 11. 8 68  Memphis 2 . 2 10. 9 20 
Atlanta 7 . 4  16. 8 44 San Diego 1. 8 4. 5 40 
Detroit 7. 2 11. 0 66 
Phoenix 7. l 12. 5 57 
Golden State 6. 5 13. 5 48 
Kansas City-
Omaha 5 .  6 9. 6 58  
Philadelphia 4. 7 15. 3 31 
Cleveland 4. 0 11. 0 3 6  
Houston 4. 0 10. 2 39 
NBA 8. 8 14. l 62% ABA 5. 5 l o. 5 52% 
FOOTBALL 
NFL Attend Attend 
Per Game Capacity A!C Per Game Capacity A/C 
New England 58. 6 61. 0 9 6% Atlanta 52. 5 58. 9 89°/o 
Buffalo 79. 0 80. 0 99 Chicago 47. 7 5 5 . 7 86  
Baltimore 54. 2: 60. 0 90 Dallas 58. 9 65. l 90 
Cincinnati 55.  3 5 6 . 2 9 8  Detroit 54. 0 54 . .; 99 
Cleveland 70. 0 79 .  3 88 Green Bay 50. 4 52. 9 95  
Denver 50. 8 51. 7 98 Los Angeles 74. 6 76. 0 98 
Houston 31. 3 50. 0 6 3  Minnesota 46. 9 49. 8 94 
Kansas City 65. 6 78.  0 84 New Orleans 64. 5 81. 0 80 
Miami 63. 2 80. 0 79 New York Giants 65. 9 70. 9 93  
Nev: York Jets 49. 7 60. 0 83  Philadelphia . 59 .  9 6 5 . 4  9 2  
Oakland 52. 2 56. 9 93  St. Louis 47. 0 51. 2 92 
Pi.ttsburgh 46. 9 50. 0 9 2  San Francisco 54. 4 61. 0 89 
San Diego 45.  4 53 .  2 85 Washington 5 3. 0 5 3 .  0 100 
AFC 55. 6 62. 8 90 NFC 56.  l 61. 2 92 
Total NFL 55. 9 62. 0 90 
BASEBALL 
National League 
Cincinnati 
Los Angeles 
New York Mets 
St. Louis 
Philacielphia 
Chicago 
Pittsburgh 
Houston 
Montreal 
Atlanta 
San Francisco 
San Diego 
NL 
� I 0 Team 
St.  Lou�s 
New York R 
Chicago I I 
Monlreal 
Philade lphia 
Toror..to 
Buffalo 
V<Lr:.couver 
Boston 
Minnesota. I A tianta 
Detroit I 
New York Is 
Los Angeles 
Pi�tsburgh 
California. 
! 
Total 
Attend Attend 
Per Game Capacity A / C  American League Per Game 
I 
26. 9 51. 7 52o/o Baltimore 13. 1 
26. 7 56.  0 48 Boston 19 .  3 
26. 2 55 .  3 47 Detroit 22. 3 
19 . 9  so. 1 40 New York 16. 8 
19 .  7 55 .  7 35 Milwaukee 15. 8 
1 8 .  5 37 . 7 49 Cleveland 8. 9 
18 .  3 50. 2 36 Oak.land 13. 0 
1 7 .  4 45. 0 39 Kansas City 17. 8  
17, 1 28. 0 61  Minnesota 1 1 .  8 
1 1 .  8 52. 7 22 California 13 .  5 
11 .  3 58.  0 19 Chicago 1 6. 6 
s. 1 44. 8 18 Texas 9, 0 
18 .  5 48.  8 38% AL 14. 8 
Source: Attendance, Sporting News, various is sues 1973-4 
Stadium capacities, league guides, 197 3-4 
I 
2 
I ' 
3 I 
I 
3 
TAllLE 2 
HOME ATTENDANCE BY GAMES, NHL, 1973-4 SEASON 
( Attendance in Thousai1.ds ) 
I 
1
6 i 10 I 11 3 4 5 7 8 9 1 2  13 14 15.  
I I I I 
I 
39 
1 3 6  
1 10 1 1  1 7 
10 5 7 6 8 
1 2 9 8 3 5 1 1  
8 2 7 8 4 3 3 l 
1 :  
8 5 5 8 I 4 4 .  1 6 8 1 1 
i 
I , 
2 z -
I
1 
I I 
16 17 18 1 9  
1 1 19 18 
- I 37 
4 34 - I 1 
7 19 10 3 
39 
39 
39 
3 9  
2 
3 
3 
I6 8 1 1  3 19 1 1  21 35 17 29 33 102 137 89 66 2.2 
Source: Sporting News. various issues, 1973-4 
Capacity A / C  
52. 2 25% 
3 3 . 4  5 8  
54. 2 41 
6 5 . 0  2 6  
46. 0  34 
77. 0 1 2  
50. 0 26 
40. 6 44 
45 . 9  2 6  
43. 2 3 1  
46. 6  36  
33. 7 27 
49, 0 30% 
Average 
Per Game Sellouts 
1 8 . 4  3 8  
1 7 .  9 38 
17. 4 39 
1 7 . 2  3 9  
1 7 . 0  39 
1 6 . 0  39 
1 6 . 0  39 
1 6 . 0  3 9  
15.0  3 9  
15.  0 3 9  
14. 2 2 8  
1 3 . 2  1 1  
12. 8 1 1  
11. 1 4 
1 0 . 0  9 
I 
4. 8 - -
396 
TABLE 3 
HOlvfE A T TENDANCE by GAMES, WHA , 1973-4 SEASON 
( Attendance in Thousands ) 
A ttend 
Avg. 
Team\ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1  1 2  1 3  1 4  1 5  Per Game Sellouts 
Vancouver - - - 2 l l 8 12  9 3 2 1 9. l 
Qu�bec - - - 1 - 4 14 9 6 2 2 - I - 7 . 9  8 
Houston - - 1 4 2 9 1 1  9 2 l - - - - 6. 7 3 
Minnesota - - 1 6 5 10 5 6 2 - 2 2 - - 6. 7 
Winnipeg - - - l 1 1  1 3  6 3 I 4 - - - - 6 . 5 4 
Cleveland - - 1 3 3 5 9 9 6 2 I - - - - 6. 2 3 
Chicago - 8 8 1 5  6 1 1 - - - - 5 .  3 
New England - - 8 13 6 6 . 5 - - - 1 5 .  4 
Los Angeles - 3 10 12 5 6 2 1 - - - - 5 .  3 
Edmonton - 7 14 18 - - - - - 4. 3 18 
Toronto 1 I 5 20 9 1 1 1 4. 2 
Jersey - 9 12  9 5 1 2 1 - - 2 . 7 
T otal 1 9 14 37 82 91 66 60 50 27 17 7 4 2 I 38 
Source: Sporting News, various issues 1973-4 
TABLE 4
HOME ATTENDANCE BY GAMES, NATI ONAL LEAGUE 1973 SEASON 
(Attendance in Thousands) 
�nd 
0- 6- 11- 1 6 - 2 1 - 26- 3 1 - 36- 41 - 46- 5 1 -
T 5 IO 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55  
Cincinnati 1 3 17 12 5 8 1 1  5 3 5 5 
Los Angele s - - 12 1 5  1 9  1 2  8 2 2 5 5 
New York Mets - 5 9 10 9 18 10 7 3 l 2 
St. Louis - 12  25  1 5  3 1 1  4 3 2 3 
Philadelphia 1 17 1 6  14 10 3 5 3 2 l - -
Chicago 5 12 14 9 1 6  9 3 3 l 
Pittsburgh 2 12 17 14 13 6 4 l 1 - - 1 
Houston 4 9 22 14 13 13 3 1 
Montreal 1 9 23 22 1 3  3 2 
Atlanta 1 3  2 6  9 10 5 3 1 
San Francisco 26 2 1  IO  7 3 4 2 1 
San Diego 28  30 8 4 1 1 1 
Total 81  156 182 146 1 10 91 53 27 1 6  15  13 
Sollrce: Sporting Ne'\vs, various issues, 1973
56- I Average 60 Per Game 
26. 9
26. 7
26. 2
19.  9 
2 I 19. 7
18. 5
18. 3
17. 4 
17. 1
1 1 .  8 
1 1 .  3 
8. 1
2 
Sell 
Outs 
7 
5 
2 
3 
2 
4 
I 5 
29 
TABLE 5 
HO!vlE ATTENDANCE by GAMES, AMERICAN LEAGUE, 1973 SEASON 
(Attendance in Thousands) 
Attend Avg 
per 
Team 0 - 5  6 - 1 0  1 1 - 1 5  16-20 2 1  -25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51 -55 56-60 6 1 -65 66 Game S ellouts 
Detroit 7 19 18 8 9 5 6 3 2 22. 3 2 
Boston 7 24 1 6 1 0  14 7 19. 3 7 
K. City 1 4  19 14 21 5 1 7 .  8 5 
New York 3 20 2 1  l l  4 4 3 l 16. 8 
Chicag o 4 1 6  1 6  l 3  8 7 4 2 2 16.  6 3 
Milwaukee 7 22 1 7  8 8 2 5 2 15.  8 2 
CalUornia 6 25 27 JO 5 5 13.  5 
Baltimore 4 29 1 8  l l  6 2 13. 1 
Oakland 1 3  32 14 6 3 3 2 2 2 13. 0 
��i.n':".csota 15 22 24 6 3 1 1 .  8 
':e;.;:aa 28 25 10 4 3 2 9, 0 2 
Clevela:i.d 2 9  22 10 5 8 . 9  
Total l l l  240 2 1 9  122 79 53 31 14 14 6 3 2 
2 6  
soUrce: Sporting News, various issues, 1973-4
TABLE 6 
HOME ATTENDANCE BY GAMES, NBA, 1973-4 SEASON 
(Attendance in Thousands) 
'
�nd I , I ' Avg. per Te l 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll  12 13 1 4  1 5  1 6  1 7  1 8  19 20 Game Sellouts 
New York 3 6 7 25 19. 3 36 I 
Los Angeles 4 10 10 3 3 2 8 l 14. 8 12 
Seattle l l l 6 5 8 4 1 3  l l 12. 2. 28 
Boston l 7 4 l l 6 2 4 3 3 9 10. : 10 
1Hlwaukee 3 5 9 l l  1 5  10. 2. I 26 
Buffalo I l 2 l 8 3 2 l 7 2 4 3 l 3 l I 2 1 0 . 0  I 4 
Capitol 2 6 4 2 5 5 2 3 5 l 2 l 2 l 9 . 3  3 
Chicago 2 9 6 6 l 6 3 l 2 l l l 2 B. 3 3 
Po!'tland l 2 10 6 6 7 2 2 5 8 . 0  5 
Atlanta l l 10 9 B 9 2 l 7 . 4  - -
Detroit 2 4 9 5 3 4 3 2 9 7. 2 9 
Phoenix 8 l 2 5 6 8 l 7. l --
Golden State l 5 9 6 5 l 3 3 l 3 l 2 l 6. 5 3 
Ka.."1sas City-Omaha I 2 10 12 8 l 4 4 
I 
I 5, 6 4 
I I I P!".:Iade lfll.ia 1 9 10 9 7 3 1 l 4. 7 I --
Cleveland 4 18 B 5 2 l 1 2 I 
4 . 0  --
Houston B 1 1  B 8 4 l l 
I 
4. 0 --
I I I I I I I I I I I
'!'ota.1 1 5  5 1  53 77 8 9  53 46 60 42 44 29· 25 32 15 7 10 17 10 25 143 
Source: Sportinf! News, variouS issues 1973�4 
TABLE 7 
HOME A TTENDANCE by GAMES, A BA ,  1973-4 SEASON 
(Attendance in Thousands) 
�tend Avg. 
Tea 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 .2____.!.Q_ I I 12 13 14 15 16 Per Game Se llouts 
New York - 3 12 4 I I  6 - 2 2 I I - 8 . 9 
K>3ntucky 2 5 I 3 6 7 6 2 4 I I I 2 I 8. 2 4 
Indiana I I 2 7 10 12 5 4 - - 7. 3 5 
Utah . - 6 14 13 4 4 I - 7. 0
San Antonio - - I 3 8 6 7 6 2 5 3 I 6. 3 5 
Car olina I I I  5 14 5 I 3 I I - 6 .  1 
Denver - - 11 20 5 4 2 - - . - - 4 . 2  2 
Vi.r ginia . I 10 19 8 2 I - - . 3 , 0  
Memphis - 17 12 8 2 2 I - - - - - 2. 2
San Diego 14 2 1  7 - - - I .  8 
Total 33 47 54 49 34 58 57 23 33 13 5 3 3 3 3 1 18 
Source: Sporting News, various issues, 1973-4 
TABLE 8 
STADIUM CAPACITIES, BASEBALL, 1960 v e .  1974 
NATIONAL LEAGUE 
1960 1 974 
Ovmer ship Capacity Owner ship Capac itY: 
Cincinnati private 29, 600 public 5 1 ,  700 
Chicago private 36 ,  700 private 37,  700 
Los Angeles public 94. 600 private 56,  000 
San Fi·ancisco pr ivate 23, 000 public 58, 000 
Milwaukee -Atlanta public 43 , 800 public 52,  700 
Pittsburgh private 35' 000 public 50, 200 
St. Louis private 30' 500 p rivate 50, !00 
Philade lphia private 33,  600 public 5 6, 600 
Ne•.v York Mets public 55 ,  300 
Houston public 45, 000 
San Diego public 44, 800 
Montreal public 28, 000 
Sourc e :  National League Green Book ( 1 960, 1974) 
TABLE 8 (cont 1 d , ) 
STA DIUM CAPACITIES ,  BASEBALL, 1960 v e .  1 974 
AMERICAN LEAGUE 
1 9 60 1 974 
Owner ship Capacity Owner ship Capacity 
California public 43, 200 
Chicago private 46, 600 pr ivate 46, 600 
Kan s a s  City public 40' 800 
Y.la shington -Minne so ta private 28, 700 public 45, 900 
Kan s a s  City-Oakland public 3 1 , 20 0  public 50, 000 
Texas public 35 ,  700 
Baltimore public 52, 100 public 52, 100 
Cleve land public 77, 000 public 77, 000 
Detroit private 54, zoo private 54, 200 
Milwaukee public 46, 000 
New York private 65, 000 pr ivate 65, 000 
* 
Boston private 33,  400 private 33, 400 
* 
Temporarily {74-75 seasons) Ne\V York Yankee s  are playing in Shea stadium (public) , capacity 5 5 ,  300. 
Sour c e :  American League R e d  Book, { 1 960, 1 974) 
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